Obama strategy: Win hearts and minds

On March 27, in just over 3,000 carefully crafted words, President Obama articulated the new US strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Buried within the diplomatic language were some blunt realities: the war in Afghanistan is going badly for the US and Nato, al-Qaida and violent extremism have grown in strength and imperil the region, the Pakistan army and ISI have failed in their core task of containing terrorism and cannot be trusted, and the US needs regional partners to help extricate itself from the mess. It was as much as anything a recognition of the limits of American power, further constrained by the harsh economic conditions the administration has inherited.
Difficult circumstances have forced difficult choices, but this does not mean that the new strategy is bad policy. The focus on defeating al-Qaida is essential given the need to keep the US public onside, the lowering of expectations in Afghanistan is a necessary and wholly rational retreat from the overambitious “neo-con” idea of forging a liberal market democracy in Afghanistan’s mountainous deserts, the linking of Afghanistan and Pakistan an essential response to a security challenge which spans the Durand Line, and the embrace of regional partners crucial for achieving the degree of stabilisation in Afghanistan necessary to create an exit opportunity for US and Nato forces.
The glummest faces are in Islamabad. The milch-cow of the Bush administration’s unconditional military largesse has been slain and replaced by a framework of re-focused military aid, subject to tough conditionality and tied to counter-terror outcomes. The “Af-Pak” linkage recasts Pakistan as part of the problem and downgrades its stand-alone importance to the US. The emphasis on supporting “constructive diplomacy” between Pakistan and India is an important sop to Pakistani concerns in the region, but one which pointedly omitted the ‘K’ word as a signal that it will not be allowed to leverage the issue against the Americans’ main objectives in Pakistan. It is equally a nod to India that new opportunities are on offer and further recognition that if Pakistan implodes or falls to Islamic extremism, India will be the indispensable partner on the eastern edge of Islam’s volatile borders.
There is also an astute understanding that ultimately Pakistan’s future will depend on its people, not its elites. “To avoid the mistakes of the past, we must make clear that our relationship with Pakistan is grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistani people,” Obama said, a commitment backed up by a $7.5-billion investment of “direct” support to the Pakistani people, suggesting this aid may not be funnelled through corrupt Pakistani political leaders and ministries. Obama’s phraseology is a clear reference to the failure of past US policy which has consistently supported the small military-political elite and ignored the political, economic, and social progress of the Pakistani people as a secondary problem.
It is now crystal clear that the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan is the new battleground. If the self-serving Pakistani elite fails to provide ordinary Pakistanis with security, meet their basic material needs and political aspirations, deliver a fairer federal dispensation and respond to the demands of an emergent middle class, then terrorists and extremists of every hue are poised to colonise that ground. This process is already underway in the FATA and NWFP, in Balochistan, and is unfolding across the rest of Pakistan including major cities such as Karachi and Rawalpindi. The recent high-profile attacks in Lahore, claimed by Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP, demonstrate not only the audacity and reach of groups which were once thought to be confined to the tribal areas, but also the apparent impotence of Pakistan’s security forces to halt their rise. The final bulwark against these terrorists is not therefore the police or even the army/ISI, but the moderation and political sophistication of ordinary Pakistanis. The emphasis in the Obama package on support for schools, roads, hospitals, employment opportunities, and democracy, and the commitment to ask other nations to provide similar support, reaches out directly to them.
There are however no simple levers to pull in Pakistan to achieve desired outcomes, and when squeezed its politico-military elite has usually reacted sharply with unpredictable, sometimes even irrational, counterpressure. The road ahead is thus strewn with bear-traps. One is that the US military surge planned for Afghanistan has reportedly brought the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban into a closer alliance and strengthened the links between the Taliban and al-Qaida and Punjabi terrorist groups. Another is that the Pakistan army/ISI, whose strategic objectives in Afghanistan will fail if the US surge is successful, may be tempted to step up their support for the Afghan Taliban and increase the pressure on US/Nato supply lines. A third is that, if mishandled, increased pressure on the Pakistan army/ISI will further fuel anti-Western or pro-Islamist sympathies within their ranks. This is why military aid must be nuanced and go hand in hand with efforts to reconnect the US and Pakistan militaries. It is also why empowering Pakistani policing rather than the armed forces should become a policy focus. Lastly there is a danger that the hopes raised by Obama’s civilian aid package will be dashed if — as is usual — the bulk of the aid fails to reach the intended recipients and is instead siphoned off by Washington’s beltway bandits, foreign nationals working in Pakistan, and local sub-contractors (including, of course, companies controlled by the Pakistan army). It is imperative therefore that this aid is subject to tight monitoring.
Pakistan is in a perilous state, already written off by many, but it has proven time and again to be more robust and resilient than the doomsayers will allow. It is likely that in four years the Obama strategy will not have achieved all it today seeks to do in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. However for ordinary Pakistanis, and for the burgeoning meritocratic middle-class which offers the possibility of real political evolution in Pakistan, the Obama strategy represents a moment of genuine hope. Now it is up to the regional players, including India, to seize this moment of opportunity in the interest of all the people of the region.
Shaun Gregory is the director of Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, UK and author of a forthcoming book, ‘Pakistan: Securing the Insecure State’

NO QUICK GETAWAYS: US army operations along the Af-Pak border